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Programming the landscape – the objectification of space  
 
ABSTRACT: 
The following paper will attempt to illuminate and elaborate on a distinct pattern 
of human behavior, namely the idea that the collective actions of groups (cultures) 
are directed toward the objectification of their environments. This paper will 
attempt to prove that this is indeed the case, and further, explain why and how 
this behavior is undertaken. The more focused implication of this broad assertion 
is that groups are motivated to program their landscapes in order to position 
themselves within a more predictable temporal trajectory. It is the assertion 
herein that the capacity for symbolic thought is the primary vehicle through which 
this achieved.  
 





Human energy is coated in a symbolic residue. It is the nature of these symbols that 
allows populations to program their environments for the maximal level of 
anticipatory efficiency. The foremost concern of this article is to prove the basic 
premise that, in general, the behavior of populations and individuals is inclined 
toward the enhancement of perceived predictability in human landscapes. This 
behavior is ultimately a product of the unique human capacity for symbolic 
reasoning. Symbols, either mental or tactile, are shared cultural constructs that 
demand conventionalization and consolidation of meaning to be most effective. In 
this sense symbols are programmed with meaning by the populations that employ 
them. As this paper hopes to illustrate, the conventionalization of semantic 
reactions engendered by symbol programming detaches the individual from the 
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sovereignty of their subjectivity, and leads to the objectification of the human 
landscape.    
This investigation posits a fundamental appreciation for how humans navigate 
our environments. It is the hypothesis of this paper that humans engage in an 
objectification of the environments we inhabit, consciously or unconsciously, in 
order to render the future more predictable. In a more dramatic conception, human 
landscape usage decisions are driven by a biologically embedded imperative to 
annihilate the unknown. This imperative may be parsed down to gems of folk 
wisdom regarding the human abhorrence of vacuums, but more essentially asserts 
the preeminence of anticipatory prowess in human decision-making.  
The survival benefit of accurately anticipating the future properties of one’s 
environment should be evident, but a few of the advantages of high predictability 
and low uncertainty are listed below: 
• It increases the amount and reliability of subsistence that can be extracted from 
an environment (knowing where a fruit tree will be or when to harvest) 
• It decreases the risk of predation or natural catastrophe 
• It minimizes the amount of energy-calories necessary for the brain to confront 
and process novel situations. 
This paper will assume that the benefit of the motivations listed above is 
inherent. Each is of varying importance, and varying relevance today, but it is clear 
to see where each motivator could be construed as advantageous, if not essential, 
to survival. Assuming that these terms are agreeable, the task is now to prove that 
the attainment of these goals is accomplished through a process of objectification of 
the human environment.  
As an opening caveat, it is crucial to assert that the behaviors to be addressed 
within are designed to enhance the perceived predictability of the environment. 
There are indisputably numerous, countless failures in this effort, but what is 
important is that the behaving agent feels as though they can accurately anticipate 
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future scenarios. It is this confidence that allows the agent to conserve energy on 
the anxiety of the unknown -- even if they are dead wrong. 
It is the supposition of this paper that human populations have been capable 
of thriving in environments ill-suited to our original physical adaptations -- the 
African savannah -- precisely because we have programmed the environments we 
inhabit to conform to cultural algorithms, which may be relatively accurately 
forecasted and projected into the future, thus deriving the above list of beneficial 
effects.  
If we allow that the primary goal of social behavior is to render our environments 
more conducive to predictability, which I hope to prove in the following sections, 
we can trace this imperative to the pursuit of environmental objectification, which 
in turn, leads to the introduction of symbolic thought, and eventually to the 
deferment of subjective experience, which is ultimately what makes us 
exceptionally gifted hypothetical modelers, which includes projections the future. 
More cogently, this sequence may be visualized with the help of the following 




Objectivity, Objectification & Objects 
The words objectivity, objectification and object overflow with meaning for many 
English-speakers. There are several competing definitions and concepts for each. In 
the parlance of this paper, it is hoped that these numerous connotations can be 
bridged and inclusive of all. The primary understanding of objectivity is often as an 
opposition to subjectivity. Whereas subjectiveness is the first-hand experience of an 
individual, objectiveness is an alleged unbiased interpretation of the environment 
that is detached from personal experience, and based solely upon exteriorly 
verifiable data. Subjectiveness is a personal impression based on information 
accrued through the five individual senses, objectiveness is supported by 
information from trusted sources, e.g., the theoretical objectivity of the newspaper. 
There has been much debate on whether total objectivity can ever be attained 
(Halbwachs 1925). It does appear that human agents, with our contingent life 
histories, are incapable of complete objectivity, however, the ideal of perfect 
objectivity is a standard against which newspapers, jurors, judges and politicians are 
often held. This debate is largely inconsequential to the present paper. 
The term objectification has come to represent the dehumanization of people, 
places or things, often towards ill-intentioned ends. When we speak of objectifying 
women, we are stripping them of their individuality, their personality, and basically 
disconnecting them from their subjective experiences of life -- transforming them 
into predictable and programmable objects. It is the contention of this paper that 
this process is fundamentally undertaken in order to reduce the anxieties of the 
unknown, and imbue the objectifier with the (false) confidence inherent in control. 
This process can be applied to individuals, groups and even environments. While it 
may seem quizzical to speak of dehumanizing something that is not human (i.e. can 
we really dehumanize a landscape?), what is truly meant by this, is to desubjectify, 
that is, to attribute desired programmable properties. And it is certainly possible to 
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attribute desired properties to a landscape, or in other words to objectify the 
landscape. 
The term object(s), on its own, is also considered in a very precise sense 
herein. Of primary concern is that objects exhibit properties which may be mapped, 
described, projected and fully understood. The woman as an object has properties 
which can be controlled and projected, whereas the woman (or any gender) as an 
individual is unpredictable, thus a source of anxiety -- negatively taxing on our 
energy allocation. Another operative distinction for the term object is that, while 
objects may not intrinsically be man-made, “objectified things” are intrinsically 
products of human endeavor. For example a tree -- not a man-made creation -- may 
still be considered an object. In classifying a tree as an object we, again, are ascribing 
properties and behaviors to the tree which may be predicted and projected. 
Whether or not our predictions and projections are accurate is ultimately rather 
irrelevant. What is significant is that we have confidence in our predictions and 
projections, and may thus limit our anxieties. In short, what defines an object for 
purposes of this paper is something that can be programmed to behave according to 
human laws and conceptions of the future. 
In this case, “objective” is not meant to convey any claims to absoluteness or 
correctness, only the common reality that a majority of a population indulges. For 
example, we willingly defer our own subjective experiences of the flatness of the 
Earth to peers who have cultivated much more in-depth knowledge of this subject, 
such as Pythagorus, Eratosthenes, or Magellan -- we can objectively say that the 
Earth is spherical. Similarly millions of Germans deferred their subjective 
experiences of reality to the objective reality of Hitler during World War II. Just 






It is my belief that the process of objectification outlined within has been 
undertaken in some extent for at least some 2.6 million years, back to the 
appearance of the first stone tools in Africa, presumably belonging to our 
Australopithecine relatives (McHenry and Coffing 2000). And, to be clear this is a 
behavior that falls upon a spectrum, it is not a condition which one either has or has 
not. Chimpanzees are capable of the same behaviors, but the quantity and quality of 
their objectification process appears diminished in comparison to our own.  
The objectification of the landscape is also a process that predates the 
material manipulation of stones or timber. As Bradley notes (1993), long before the 
megaliths of Northwestern Europe “artificially” transformed cultural spaces, 
“natural” landmarks were employed for similar purposes. A noteworthy tree, or 
natural rock formation of some distinction are equally capable of serving the 
cultural, symbolic role played by monuments and other man-made landscape 
alterations. Symbolic objectification did not begin with symbolic objects. It began 
through interaction -- the need to defer to an objective reality to enhance 
cooperative impact, to be discussed in-depth below.  
The introduction of material objects into the human toolkit, such as hand axes, 
or the timber-derived implements that must have surely preceded them, but failed 
to survive into the archaeological record, signal a change from passive receiver of 
environmental symbols to active manipulator and transformer of the environment. 
This transformation and its philosophical implications has been discussed at length 
(Wynn & Coolidge 2004; McHenry and Coffing 2000). To varying degrees human 
populations expanding from Africa through the Middle East and Asia, and eventually 
to Western Europe utilized an increasingly complex toolkit from the environmental 
resources they encountered.  
The significant leap forward in the material record that allows a more 
qualitative glimpse into the mind of our prehistoric predecessors is the appearance 
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of cave art and other aesthetic depictions, roughly around 35,000 years ago. This is 
an extremely significant turning point, and almost certainly denotes that the 
populations engaging in this activity possessed a robust language.  
The enhanced durability of thought provided by cave art must have been an 
instrumental step in the ability to program human environments. However, while 
these early symbolic advances were extremely critical, we can infer that they were 
more or less not public symbols. While we cannot positively assert that they were an 
exclusive symbolic code (Bradley 1993), the very fact of their location in out-of-the-
way caves and crevices, limits the amount of widespread exposure and effect they 
were capable of having on expanding populations. Moreover, evidence seems to 
indicate that many of the locations of the oldest cave art went completely 
unoccupied and undiscovered until modern excavation work (ibid), further limiting 
the impact they may have had in spurring the explosion of landscape objectification 
with which this study is concerned. 
A critical element of the thesis of this paper is that the sort of landscape 
programming that was engaged in during the Neolithic was both extremely public 
and extremely durable. It is these factors which distinguish the landscape alterations 
undertaken by Neolithic populations from those of previous populations. The 
substantiative fact is that the totality of the paleolithic industry, no matter how 
complex, does not survive today. This in itself is at least slightly telling. Without a 
material objectification or material symbolic system that can endure across 
generations, the conceptual vitality of a population is significantly diminished. 
It is when we reach the Neolithic with its associated landscape alterations, 
both monumental and subsistence-based (agriculture/domestication), that the sort 
of long-term, wide spread programming of spaces, with which this paper is 





It is the goal of the following sections to erase any doubt that human populations do 
indeed engage in the manner of environmental objectification that is the premise of 
this article. In accomplishing this goal, I will provide evidence for the uniqueness of 
human hypothetical and predictive skill, as well as suggest the various motivations 
for why objectification has proven an asset in human social and biological evolution.  
Human populations tend to objectify their environments in order to reduce 
uncertainty and enhance predictive capacity, along with the other motivators listed 
in the introduction. In fleshing out the position of this paper -- that humans objectify 
the environments they inhabit -- evidence will be presented that human symbolic 
communication processes, be they language, art or ritual, are the primary tools with 
which this objectification is executed. One property of symbolic interaction, among 
others, is that it serves to consolidate the accepted reality of a population through 
the conventionalization of semantic reactions (Korzybski 1933). There is, of course, 
never perfect consolidation, as the myriad political disagreements of today attests, 
but the behavior of symbols trends toward an ultimate objectivity, just as does the 
newspaper reporter. 
Below are three lines of evidence to support the assertion that symbolic 
reasoning allows and inspires the objectification of human space, namely: 1) the 
uniqueness of human test subjects to appreciate that others possess false beliefs 
will demonstrate a distinct skill in human predictive capacity; 2) A predisposition to 
imitative behavior has been selected for in human evolution, and serves to reinforce 
the tendency toward consolidation of competing subjective reactions to the 
environment; and 3) human cognition is a socially distributed process, reliant upon 
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1.) False Belief & Hypothetical Modeling 
The False Belief Test is a commonly deployed experiment in psychology and 
linguistics, aimed at understanding when children begin to acquire Theory of Mind -- 
the appreciation that others possess thoughts, beliefs and motivations that are 
dissimilar from their own. The design is meant to test if the subject understands that 
another’s mental representation of a situation is different from their own. A typical 
test of this nature involves a child being shown that a hypothetical character who 
has been deceived about the whereabouts of a token, i.e., the character’s token is 
hidden when the character leaves the room. When asked where the character will 
look for its token upon returning, if the child answers that the character will look for 
the token where it actually is, then the child has failed the test. The correct answer, 
in terms of passing the False Belief test is to answer that the character will look 
where the token was when the character last knew its whereabouts (Baron-Cohen 
1985).   
While this test is most often used in developmental psychology, and toward 
understanding the acquisition of language in children, it more vividly illuminates 
whether a child is capable of hypothetically projecting. I would suggest that a test of 
this nature more accurately measures, not whether a child perceives the mental 
states of others, but rather their ability to retain hypothetical models in their mind. 
As children under the age of four consistently “fail” this test (Baron-Cohen 1985), it 
may indicate that rather than being unable to appreciate that others possess false 
beliefs, children at this age are limited to more literal or subjective thought 
processes -- that is, they are unable or unwilling to defer their personal experiences 
of reality to a more conceptual interpretation. In short, the child is given a 
hypothetical situation and asked to predict the most likely outcome. After five years 
of age children consistently “pass” the False Belief test (ibid). The psychological 
research would seem to indicate that we do not possess this ability until four years 
of age, but that once we do come to harness this skill, through the accrual of 
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additional real world experience, we become very accurate predictors and modelers 
of hypothetical scenarios.  
Comparatively, to draw on experiments conducted by biological 
anthropologists on the faculties of our primate relatives, it has been shown that 
chimpanzees, of all ages, have consistently failed False Belief tests (Call & Tomasello 
2008). This failure comes in spite of the fact that, as the authors write, 
“chimpanzees understand both the goals and intentions of others as well as the 
perception and knowledge of others (ibid).” That is, they appreciate all aspects of 
Theory of Mind, with the exception of projecting hypothetical models. What this 
ultimately demonstrates is that chimpanzees lack the capacity or willingness to 
subvert their subjective experiences into predictable objects, the very nature of a 
hypothetical model. 
This evidence simply indicates that among our primate relatives, we are skilled 
hypothetical modelers, an indispensable attribute for predictive acuity. I have 
suggested that this skill is derived from a willingness to defer our subjective 
experiences. Further, I have suggested that this willingness is a byproduct of 
symbolic thought processes, and this is subsequently the result of our tendency 
toward objectification. Accordingly, the next line of evidence to be presented will 
illustrate how and why we engage in the deferment of subjective knowledge when 
engaging in public and social behaviors. 
 
2.) Imitation is the Sincerest Form of Survival 
From the above we have seen that humans have a unique knack for the hypothetical 
modeling of the future, that is, predicting. Reflecting the model offered in the 
introduction, we will continue to trace back this skill at prediction to the willingness 
and ability to defer subjective knowledge in public and social environments. 
The famous Asch-Line test, in which the power of groupthink is vividly 
demonstrated, shows that social considerations, such as “being liked” and “fitting-
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in” motivate much of a population to behave as one. In this experiment originally 
conducted by Solomon Asch (1955), one test subject is placed in a room with a 
handful of confederates and the group is asked to select, from a series of lines, two 
lines that match in length. The mathematically correct answer is rather apparent, 
but the confederates consistently agree on an incorrect answer. After a single trial, 
the test subject is shown to agree with the confederates and answer “incorrectly” 
due to the social pressure to imitate.  
The conclusions of this test, as well as research conducted by others, suggest 
that the consolidation of diverse subjective experience is motivated by mechanisms 
that favor imitation over distinctiveness in social groups. There can be no better 
definition of subjective deferment than the act of imitating, so by exploring the 
properties and benefits of imitation, the hope is to prove that socially adaptive 
behaviors encourage the deferment of subjective points of view. The following 
paragraphs will discuss the proposed evolutionary benefits of imitative behavior in 
order to demonstrate that the consolidating of subjective viewpoints is highly 
adaptive.  
Entrainment, as studied by Kinsbourne (2005), is the process of social mimicry 
which may serve to underwrite the adaptive benefits of our highly refined imitative 
skill, and the properties of our unique interactive behavior. “Entrainment is adopting 
shared rhythms of behavior (Kinsbourne 2005).” A baby’s gaze that follows its 
mother’s, a gang of friends who share inflections and slangs, and a sleazy salesman 
trying to gain your confidence are all practicing entrainment.  
It is proposed that imitating the behaviors of another produces social affability 
and encourages congenial relations (ibid). Kinsbourne writes, “imitation is more 
about affiliation or attachment than about learning.” In describing the learning 
process that is a byproduct of imitating, Kinsbourne continues, “what the baby cares 
about is not the name [of an object], but the joint regard itself, the fact that the 
adult is doing what the baby is doing.” Kinsbourne has suggested many explanations 
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for this phenomenon. Among these are the postulate that Homo Sapiens are a 
comparatively weak mammal physically, so sustaining strong peer bonds was an 
indispensable survival trait in competing with other mammals. There is also the 
belief that we are attracted to those that mirror our own behaviors because it saves 
cognitive calories in attempting to forecast the future behavior of an interactant 
(Meltzoff 2005). Entraining with others decreases anxiety. As Halbwachs (1925) 
demonstrated, being able to accurately gauge the near-future decreases anxieties 
derived from the “unknown,” and when an interlocutor exhibits behavior 
substantially different from our own, it is harder to gauge their ensuing actions.  
Simply, we find comfort in having our expectations met, and it makes carrying 
out coordinated activities with others more feasible. 
Tomasello offers another suggestion for why humans exhibit imitative 
tendencies. In his article (2006) on why other primates do not point, he describes an 
evolutionarily adaptive motivation for sharing psychological states that is present in 
human populations. An element of the shared psychological states that Tomasello 
describes includes common reactions to environmental stimuli -- sharing the feeling 
of disgust at the sight of excrement. Sharing goals and experiences serves to embed 
mutual benefit to interlocutors (if not mutual benefit, at least a mutual fate, as is the 
case in warfare and violence). 
From Tomasello’s theory we can see that imitation also works on much more 
macro scales than the personalized entrainment mentioned above. Gergely and 
Csibra (2006) suggest that human imitative aptitude is an adaptive trait which allows 
for greater degrees of cultural fidelity across generations. While it may be 
questioned whether long term cultural rigidity is truly beneficial -- failure to adapt to 
changing environments because of strict adherence to cultural practices and 
traditions that have worked in the past has led to the demise of numerous 
populations throughout history (Greenland 1400, Easter Island 1750, Southern 
Arizona 1300 (Diamond 2005)) -- there is little question that the ability to pass on 
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the knowledge a culture has attained through traditions, rituals, and direct language 
can be a very beneficial short-term behavior. Again, the ability to predict the human 
landscape is paramount. 
Cultural fidelity is a crucial element of maintaining a predictable environment 
(or at least the illusion of predictability). Briefly, practices that were useful at the 
time they were established (such as the Jewish aversions to hoofed animals or 
shellfish in the pre-Christian Levant), do tend to endure. This sort of perpetuation of 
cultural tradition may be perceived as a system of temporal or generational 
imitation. Imitation and replication of behaviors and traits is the path of least 
resistance. From a basal energy sense, it takes much more energy to deviate than to 
perpetuate. 
Once again reflecting on the thesis of this paper, it should now be evident that 
deferment of subjective experience does occur in human social interaction, and has 
enough adaptive benefit to force a test subject to disregard the reality in front of 
them to conform with the popular reality, i.e., the Asch-Line test. How does this 
property of our behavior relate to predictive capacity? This article suggests that it is 
the deferment of the reality in front of our faces that allows us to engage in complex 
hypothetical modeling -- hypothetical modeling being critical for predictive prowess. 
We can temporarily disengage from the reality before our eyes in order to chart 
numerous possible realities. 
To be clear, accurate hypothetical models can and do rely on individual 
experience, however, what affords the distinctness of human predictive skill is our 
ability to depersonalize the future. For instance, it is often the case that if one’s 
hypothetical model of the future is too shaded by personal bias, the effectiveness of 
prediction is diminished. As an example, if every time that we go to a meeting 
everyone is 15 minutes late, we may begin to adjust our own arrival time back 15 
minutes in anticipation of this. Subsequently when we are invited to a more formal 
meeting where punctuality is expected, in order to arrive on time, we will have to 
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defer our first-hand knowledge of meetings starting 15 minutes late, and submit to 
the punctual reality of the more formal meeting.   
 
3.) The Map is not the Territory 
Above, we asked and attempted to answer the question of how subjective 
deference relates to predictive capacity. Herein, we will ask how does symbolic 
reasoning relate to subjective deference. The short answer is that the 
conventionalization and consolidation of semantic responses needed to effectively 
utilize symbols is the first step toward more large scale deferment of first-hand 
knowledge.  
It has been illustrated above that humans possess a unique ability to conform 
their environments into hypothetical models (programs), and some of the reasons 
how and why this is accomplished were presented (the subjective deferment 
contained in imitative social practices that counteract deficiencies in human 
physiology and conserve caloric energy expenditure in the brain associated with 
levels of anxiety). Here, an attempt will be made to detail exactly how the 
environment becomes objectified through the distribution of cognitive energy in the 
form of symbols, allowing human groups the most efficient navigation of their 
environments. 
Edwin Hutchins (1995) argues that, like language, cognition is not a private 
affair. Hutchins advocates an understanding of cognition that is contingent upon 
contextual mediation. The process of mental computation is more readily 
observable in the organization of social activity than the nebulous synapses of the 
individual’s brain. Hutchins offers a cogent argument for how utilizing 
environmental elements (e.g., lighthouses, trees, compasses, other people) allows 
human cognition to be “outsourced” beyond the individual brain.  
Hutchins’ cognitive ethnography of Western naval procedure extensively 
describes the charts and instruments used to determine the relationships between 
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physical bodies on the landscape. To contrast this naval methodology, he outlines 
contemporary Micronesian navigational techniques, which include concepts such as 
moving islands and phantom islands -- concepts poorly envisioned by Western 
audiences. In highlighting the diversity of navigational methods that are capable of 
safely piloting a vessel to its destination, Hutchins builds his case for the 
incorporation of cultural phenomena into cognitive computation. He writes that, “in 
the Western tradition, artifacts become repositories of knowledge, and they are 
constructed in durable media so that a single artifact might come to represent more 
than any individual could know.” Here, Hutchins is describing artifacts like 
compasses, maps or astrolabes, but he is also indicating how we use objects to 
orient ourselves and plan/predict our next movements/actions accordingly.  
The cognitive ethnography that Hutchins conducts aboard a U.S. naval vessel 
reveals that, in addition to the tactile cultural artifacts that we use to orient and 
project our immediate actions (compasses, site-finders, telescopes, etc.), the most 
visibly influential environmental elements of cognition are human interlocutors. As 
the sailors Hutchins studies interact with the various tools of navigation to complete 
calculations, so too do they interact with their peers. Through the distribution of 
information among both a group population and its cultural tools, cognitive 
computation may be performed more or less outside the depths of the brain, that is, 
beyond the subjective variability of individuals. The organization of cultural artifacts 
and human interlocutors transforms a complex task like piloting an aircraft carrier 
into a simple product of the sequential ordering of automatic tasks. Herbert Simon 
writes, “solving a problem simply means representing it so as to make the solution 
transparent (1981).”  
As motivators for solving complex problems, distributed cognition 
(desubjectified cognition) and the consolidation of reality, seem extremely useful. It 
is easy to see how populations that are best able to distribute their cognitive 
prowess would possess substantial adaptive advantages (Dawkins 1976), when faced 
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with a severe ecological or economic problem. It is impossible for any single sailor to 
guide an immense aircraft carrier from one port to another, however through social 
interaction and collaboration this task appears, if not easy, then at least 
programmable.  
Through interaction, the computational apparatus that allows the 
transformation of cognitive processes into cultural processes becomes constructed. 
The cultivation of relationships and roles on a naval ship, or in any social setting, is 
similar to the charts that Hutchins details, in which the most effective maps are 
those that express the most relationships between environmental features. “The 
number of relationships on a chart is a measure of the knowledge contained in the 
chart...There may be more knowledge on the chart than was put into the chart 
(Hutchins 1995).” While Hutchins is referencing landscape relationships on a map in 
this quote, the statement may be applied to social relationships as well. The more 
objects (including people) upon which an activity or problem may be distributed, the 
more accurate the resolution of the task appears. The website Wikipedia, 
demonstrates the power of distributed reality editing.  
An organism cannot successfully navigate its environment without being able 
to act on environmental data in an advantageous manner, and for humans this data 
is most effectively computed through distribution and interaction in groups. 
Hutchins’ research concerns how the use of cultural symbols aids in the navigation 
of the landscape -- physical and social -- and how this process requires collaborative 
cartography, and vigilant editing of the social map. By ascribing a symbolic meaning 
to all the elements of the environment, that is, by naming things, including people, 
we objectify them. Subsequently, inconsistencies in a symbol system are edited out 
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Conclusion 
Objects are easier to predict than experiences. Subjective individual experiences 
prove too unreliable, in comparison with the aggregate knowledge of a large 
population. The use of symbols in our interactions is a result of the adaptive benefit 
of predictability. The semantic resonance of our cultural symbols certainly evolves 
over time, on a day to day basis, our symbolic vocabulary is very predictable -- we 
largely know what to expect when someone utters the phoneme “car” or “bicycle.” 
In evolutionary terms, the degree to which an individual or society is capable of 
predicting the behavior of the system within which it resides, the greater the 
likelihood of survival for that individual or society. I believe this hypothesis provides 
the highest resolution model for the origins for language and the motivations for 
social interaction, and marks a fundamental property that influences the structure 
of civilization. Further, understanding these key concepts answers several questions 
about the development of human behavior, in all its complexity.  
Essentially, dexterity in predicting the behavior of a system correlates with 
success at modeling the future. In large part, the social sciences are engaged in 
understanding one of the most complex systems we encounter -- human behavior. 
Economics, psychology, and to a lesser extent, anthropology ultimately strive 
toward describing human behavior in such a manner that it is replicable. There are 
systems of such complexity that we have not been able to program predictability 
into them to a satisfactory extent. Obvious examples of this are the climate, 
economic fluctuations, and the neural networks that compose the brain. Given the 
overwhelming complexity of these systems, the strides we have made at predicting 
them are very impressive.  
Language-users tacitly accept that all elements of their environment are 
containers of meaning. Because of this, all environmental elements possess a use-
value, not quantitatively, but relationally. As discussed above, the relational value of 
a lighthouse that helps us navigate our environment is substantial, while the 
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relational value of one tree among a forest is rather marginal. However, by 
possessing a differential use-value both lighthouse and tree are environmental 
objects.   
The more people/objects that can verify information, the more accurately this 
information is perceived to mirror an idealized perfect reality. Of course there is no 
perfect reality, it is simply an abstract concept, like circle or soul-mate, towards 
which symbol-using populations strive. The theoretical conclusion to a “perfected 
reality” is a reality completely detached from subjective influence -- the 
consolidation of reality into an object, as opposed to an experience. While progress 
in social freedoms such as same-sex marriage are welcome, the fact that all love 
must be unified by the symbol of marriage to be validated (in the eyes of some) is an 
unfortunate reality which ultimately serves to objectify the experience of love.  
The point of this exploration is by no means to offer potential lines of 
investigation that are capable of rendering a more predictable appreciation of 
human behavior. If anything, from the standpoint of this author, total objective 
predictability is an outcome to be cautioned against. Instead, this paper would like 
to illuminate the trend that symbolizing creatures such as ourselves gravitate 
toward predictability in our environments, in hopes that being conscious of this 
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